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JosephNye_2010G-_谈权力转移_
I'm going to talk to you about power in this 21st century. 我想讨论的 是21世纪的权利。
And basically , what I'd like to tell you is that power is changing, and there are two types of changes 基本上我想告诉大家的 是权利的变化, 有两种变化
basically:adv.主要地,基本上;
I want to discuss. 是我想探讨的。
One is power transition , which is change of power amongst states. 一种是权利的转移, 国家和国家之间的权利变化。
transition:n.过渡;转变;变革;变迁;v.经历转变过程;过渡; amongst:prep.在…之中;在…当中(等于among);
And there the simple version of the message is it's moving from West to East. 这是对权利转移的简单解读, 即权利正从西方转移到东方。
The other is power diffusion , the way power is moving from all states West or East to non-state actors. 另一种是权利的分散, 即权利的转移 是从西方和东方的各个国家 到非国家的范围。
diffusion:n.扩散,传播;[光]漫射;
Those two things are the huge shifts of power in our century. 以上两种情况 是本世纪权利的 重要转移。
shifts:n.转移; v.转移; (shift的第三人称单数)
And I want to tell you about them each separately and then how they interact and why, in the end, there may be some good news. 我想分别说说这两种情况 和它们之间的相互影响 以及为什么说最终可能是个好消息。
separately:adv.分别地;分离地;个别地; interact:v.互相影响;互相作用;n.幕间剧;幕间休息;
When we talk about power transition, we often talk about the rise of Asia. 说到权利的转移, 我们经常会提起亚洲的崛起。
It really should be called the recovery or return of Asia. 确切地说应该称作 亚洲的复兴或者亚洲的回归。
recovery:n.恢复,复原;痊愈;重获;
If we looked at the world in 1800, you'd find that more than half of the world's people lived in Asia and they made more than half the world's product. 回顾19世纪的 世界, 你会发现世界上一半以上的人口 都居住在亚洲 而且他们生产的产品占了世界总量的一半以上。
Now fast forward to 1900: half the world's people -- more than half -- still live in Asia, but they're now making only a fifth of the world's product. 现在我们来看20世纪, 世界上一般的人口——超过一半——仍然在亚洲居住, 但是他们的生产总值 进占全球的五分之一。
What happened? The Industrial Revolution , which meant that all of a sudden , 这是为什么呢？工业革命, 也就是说突然之间,
Industrial Revolution:n.工业革命; all of a sudden:突然地,出乎意料地;
Europe and America became the dominant center of the world. 欧洲和美国 成为主导世界的中心。
dominant:adj.显性的;占优势的;支配的,统治的;n.显性;
What we're going to see in the 21st century is Asia gradually returning to being more than half of the world's population and more than half of the world's product. 而到了21世纪,我们看到的 是亚洲将重新回到 占世界一半以上人口 和生产总值的位置。
gradually:adv.渐渐地;逐步地;
That's important and it's an important shift. 这很重要,而且是一次重大的权利转移。
But let me tell you a little bit about the other shift that I'm talking about, which is power diffusion. 但是接下来我要和你们探讨一下 刚才提到的另外一种转移, 那就是权利分散。
To understand power diffusion put this in your mind: computing and communications costs have fallen a thousandfold between 1970 and the beginning of this century. 要理解权利分散 就要明白一点: 计算和交流的成本 已经降到原来的千分之几 从1970年 到本世纪初。
computing:n.计算;计算机技术;信息处理技术;v.计算;求出;(compute的现在分词) thousandfold:adv.千倍地;adj.千倍的;
Now that's a big abstract number. 这个数字很大,很抽象,
abstract:n.摘要; adj.抽象的; vt.摘要; vi.做摘要;
But to make it more real, if the price of an automobile had fallen as rapidly as the price of computing power, you could buy a car today for five dollars. 但是具体来说, 如果汽车价格 的降幅 和计算机的降幅一样, 那么今天你只花五美元, 就可以买辆车。
automobile:n.汽车;v.开汽车;坐汽车;adj.自动的;
Now when the price of any technology declines that dramatically , the barriers to entry go down. 那么如果所有的技术价格 都以这个幅度下跌, 获得这一技术的门槛就会降低;
technology:n.技术;工艺;术语; declines:vi.下降;衰退;拒绝(decline的第三人称单数); dramatically:adv.戏剧地;引人注目地;adv.显著地,剧烈地; barriers:n.障碍;栅栏;篱笆墙(barrier的复数形式);
Anybody can play in the game. 人人都可以享有。
So in 1970, if you wanted to communicate from Oxford to Johannesburg to New Delhi to Brasilia and anywhere simultaneously , you could do it. 从20世纪70年代开始, 如果你想 从牛津到约翰内斯堡 或到新德里 或到巴西利亚 或是其他任何地方获得即时通讯, 是可行的,
Delhi:n.德里(印度城市名); simultaneously:adv.同时地;
The technology was there. 因为技术已经发展到了这个阶段。
But to be able to do it, you had to be very rich -- a government, a multinational corporation , maybe the Catholic Church -- but you had to be pretty wealthy. 但是要真正做到这一点, 你需要很有钱才行—— 你要么是政府,要么是跨国公司, 也可能是基督教堂 不过你得及其有钱才行。
multinational:adj.跨国公司的;多国的;n.跨国公司; corporation:n.法人;(大)公司;法人团体;市政委员会; Catholic:adj.天主教的;宽宏大量的;n.天主教徒;罗马天主教;
Now, anybody has that capacity , which previously was restricted by price just to a few actors. 但是几天人人都能享有这些技术, 以前人们受到价格的制约 只有少数人才能享有,
capacity:n.能力;容量;资格,地位;生产力; previously:adv.先前;以前; restricted:adj.受限制的;保密的;v.限制(restrict的过去式和过去分词);
If they have the price of entry into an Internet cafe -- the last time I looked, it was something like a pound an hour -- and if you have Skype , it's free. 如果人们有足够的钱去网吧—— 我上次查到的价格大概是每小时一磅左右—— 但是如果你用Skype,是免费的。
Skype:n.网络电话(一个网络语音沟通工具);
So capabilities that were once restricted are now available to everyone. 所以曾经 被限制的能力 现在人人都可以享有。
And what that means is not that the age of the State is over. 这并不意味着 国家的时代结束了。
The State still matters. 国家依然很重要。
But the stage is crowded. 但是舞台是很拥挤的。
The State's not alone. There are many, many actors. 国家不可能单独存在。还有很多很多的角色。
Some of that's good: 其中有一些是好的角色。
Oxfam, a great non-governmental actor. 比如牛津饥荒救济委员会（乐施会） 就是一个很重要的非政府角色。
non-governmental:非政府的;非官方的;
Some of it's bad: 其中也有一些是不好的。
Al Qaeda, another non-governmental actor. 基地组织,是另一个非政府角色。
But think of what it does to how we think in traditional terms and concepts. 但是试想这些对我们 传统的思维方式和观念有哪些改变。
traditional:传统的,惯例的,
We think in terms of war and interstate war. 我们过去考虑的是战争 和内战。
interstate:adj.州际的;州与州之间的;n.(美)州际公路;
And you can think back to 1941 when the government of Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor . 大家可以想一想1941年, 日本政府 日本政府袭击美国珍珠港。
United:adj.联合的; v.联合,团结; (unite的过去分词和过去式) Pearl:n.珍珠; v.使成小圆粒; adj.珍珠(制)的; Harbor:n.港口;港湾;(比喻)避难所;[军]坦克掩蔽场;v.停泊;包含;隐匿;怀抱(恶意);
It's worth noticing that a non-state actor attacking the United States in 2001 killed more Americans than the government of Japan did in 1941. 只得注意的是 在2001年,一个非政府的角色 袭击了美国 在这次袭击中丧生的美国人超过了 1941年日本政府的行为。
You might think of that as the privatization of war. 你可能会想 战争已经不再是国家行为。
privatization:n.私有化;
So we're seeing a great change in terms of diffusion of power. 因此我们看到的是权力分散的 一个重大变化。
Now the problem is that we're not thinking about it in very innovative ways. 可问题是 我们对此的看法不够新。
innovative:adj.革新的,创新的;
So let me step back and ask: what's power? 所以让我们再重新审视 并且想一想:什么是权利？
Power is simple the ability to affect others to get the outcomes you want, and you can do it in three ways. 权利其实就是一种能力 能够影响他人 以达到你的目的, 实现权利的方式有三种。
outcomes:n.结果;成果;后果;出路;(outcome的复数)
You can do it with threats of coercion , "sticks," 可以威胁他人, 通过强迫——棍棒,
coercion:n.强制;强迫;高压政治;威压;
you can do it with payments , "carrots," 可以买通他人 胡萝卜,
payments:n.付款;支付;收款;款项;报答;(payment的复数)
or you can do it by getting others to want what you want. 或者通过让别人心甘情愿地 做你想要达成的结果。
And that ability to get others to want what you want, to get the outcomes you want without coercion or payment, is what I call soft power. 而让别人心甘情愿地做逆向要做的, 来达到你的目的, 而不是通过强迫或买通, 就是我所说的软实力。
And that soft power has been much neglected and much misunderstood , and yet it's tremendously important. 而这种软实力很大程度上被人们所忽视 所误解了。 然而软实力是极其重要地。
neglected:adj.被忽略的; v.忽略; (neglect的过去分词和过去式) misunderstood:adj.被误解的;v.误解,误会(misunderstand的过去式); tremendously:adv.非常地;可怕地;惊人地;
Indeed, if you can learn to use more soft power, you can save a lot on carrots and sticks. 事实上,如果你知道如何 运用软实力, 你会节省很多地 胡萝卜和棍棒。
Traditionally , the way people thought about power was primarily in terms of military power. 按照惯例,人们认为权利 基本就是军事力量。
Traditionally:adv.传统上;习惯上;传说上; primarily:adv.首先;主要地,根本上; military:adj.军事的;军人的;适于战争的;n.军队;军人;
For example, the great Oxford historian who taught here at this university, A.J.P. Taylor, defined a great power as a country able to prevail in war. 例如来自牛津的伟大的历史学家 A.J.P. 泰勒 对大国的定义是 能够打赢战争的国家。
defined:adj.有定义的,确定的; v.使明确; prevail:v.流行;盛行;战胜;压倒;
But we need a new narrative if we're to understand power in the 21st century. 但是我们需要一个新的阐述 来真正懂得21世纪地权利。
narrative:n.叙述;故事;讲述;adj.叙事的,叙述的;叙事体的;
It's not just prevailing at war, though war still persists . 权利不仅仅是赢得战争 尽管战争依旧存在。
prevailing:adj.流行的;一般的;占优势的;v.盛行,流行;获胜;(prevail的现在分词形式) persists:vi.存留,坚持;持续,固执;vt.坚持说,反复说;
It's not whose army wins; it's also whose story wins. 哪一个国家的军队赢了并不重要; 重要的是谁讲的故事能够赢得人心。
And we have to think much more in terms of narratives and whose narrative is going to be effective . 而且我们需要进一步考虑这个阐释 以及谁的阐释更加有效。
narratives:n.叙述,故事;叙述的手法(narrative复数); effective:adj.有效的,起作用的;实际的,实在的;给人深刻印象;
Now let me go back to the question of power transition between states and what's happening there. 现在我要回到 国家之间 权利转移 的问题 讲讲最新的动态。
the narratives that we use now tend to be the rise and fall of the great powers. 我们现在用的阐释 大多是大国的 崛起和没落。
And the current narrative is all about the rise of China and the decline of the United States. 而近来这种阐述全都是 中国的崛起 和美国的没落
Indeed, with the 2008 financial crisis , many people said this was the beginning of the end of American power. 确实,2008年发生的经济危机 会让很多人说这是 美国领导力终结的开始。
financial:adj.金融的;财政的,财务的; crisis:n.危机;危险期;决定性时刻;adj.危机的;用于处理危机的;
The tectonic plates of world politics were shifting . 全球政治格局的板块 正在发生转变。
tectonic:adj.[地质]构造的;建筑的;地壳构造上的; politics:n.政治;钩心斗角;政治观点;v.(贬)从事政治活动;(politic的第三人称单数) shifting:adj.不断移动的;流动的;v.转移;赶快;快速移动;变换;(shift的现在分词)
And president Medvedev of Russia, for example, pronounced in 2008 this was the beginning of the end of United States power. 例如俄罗斯的总统梅德韦杰夫, 在2008年曾说过 经济危机是美国领导力结束 的开端。
But in fact, this metaphor of decline is often very misleading . 然而事实上, 这种衰落的比喻 非常误导人。
metaphor:n.暗喻,隐喻;比喻说法; misleading:adj.误导的;引入歧途的;v.误导;引入歧途;使误信;(mislead的现在分词)
If you look at history, in recent history, you'll see the cycles of belief in American decline come and go every 10 or 15 years or so. 如果回顾历史,近代历史 你会发现这种认为 美国衰落的说法 每隔10年到20年左右就会出现。
In 1958, after the Soviets put up Sputnik , it was "That's the end of America." 1958年, 苏联发射人造卫星以后 人们就说“美国要衰落了。”
Soviets:n.苏联人(soviet的复数);苏联政府; Sputnik:n.人造卫星(前苏联制造);
In 1973, with the oil embargo and the closing of the gold window, that was the end of America. 1973年的石油禁运 和黄金窗口的关闭, 又有人说美国要衰落了。
embargo:vt.禁止出入港口;禁止或限制贸易;征用或扣押;n.禁令;禁止;封港令;
In the 1980s, as America went through a transition in the Reagan period, between the rust belt economy of the midwest to the Silicon Valley economy of California, that was the end of America. 20世纪80年代, 在里根就职期间,美国经历了一次 从美国中西部老工业基地 到加州的硅谷经济的转变, 又有人在说美国要衰落了。
rust belt:n.锈带(尤指美国北部衰败或萧条的工业区); economy:n.经济;节约;理财; midwest:n.美国的中西部; Silicon Valley:n.硅谷(美国加利福尼亚州一处计算机和电子公司聚集地,有时用以指任何计算机公司聚集地);
But in fact, what we've seen is none of those were true. 但事实上,我们发现 所有这些谣言都不是真的。
Indeed, people were over-enthusiastic in the early 2000s, thinking America could do anything, which led us into some disastrous foreign policy adventures, and now we're back to decline again. 事实上,正是人们在21世纪初 过分乐观, 认为美国无所不能, 导致了我们作出了一些灾难性的 外交政策, 现在又出现了美国衰落的声音。
disastrous:adj.灾难性的;损失惨重的;悲伤的;
The moral of this story is all these narratives about rise and fall and decline tell us a lot more about psychology than they do about reality. 总之 所有这些关于崛起,倒退和衰落的阐述 讲的更多的是一种心理 而不是事实。
moral:n.寓意;品行;教益;adj.道德的;道义上的;道德上的;品行端正的; psychology:n.心理学;心理状态;
If we try to focus on the reality, then what we need to focus on is what's really happening in terms of China and the United States. 现在让我们只关注事实, 那么我们就需要关注 当下在中国和美国 正在发生的事情。
Goldman Sachs has projected that China, the Chinese economy, will surpass that of the U.S. 高盛预言 中国,中国经济 将会在2027年
surpass:v.超越;胜过,优于;非…所能办到或理解;
by 2027. 超过美国。
So we've got, what, 17 more years to go or so before China's bigger. 所以我们只剩下 在中国超过美国之前 我们只剩下17年左右。
Now someday, with a billion point three people getting richer, they are going to be bigger than the United States. 也许未来 等到这1.3亿人口富起来的时候, 他们将超过美国。
But be very careful about these projections such as the Goldman Sachs projection as though that gives you an accurate picture of power transition in this century. 但是不要轻易接受 高盛这些公司做出的预测。 尽管这些预测能给你本世纪潜力转移的 精确画面。
projections:n.预测;设想;投影;投影图;(projection的复数) accurate:adj.精确的;
Let me mention three reasons why it's too simple. 让我来给出为什么这些预测过于简单的原因。
First of all , it's a linear projection. 第一,它是线性的预测。
First of all:adv.首先; linear:adj.线的,线型的;直线的,线状的;长度的;
You know, everything says, here's the growth rate of China, here's the growth rate of the U.S., here it goes -- straight line. 种种迹象 这是中国的增长率,这是美国的增长率, 请看——直线
History is not linear. 然而历史不是一条直线。
There are often bumps along the road, accidents along the way. 历史进程经常出现曲折和突发事件。
bumps:碰撞(bump的第三人称单数);碰撞(bump的复数);
The second thing is that the Chinese economy passes the U.S. economy in, let's say, 2030, which it may it, that will be a measure of total economic size, but not of per capita income -- won't tell you about the composition of the economy. 第二 中国经济 如果说在2030年超过了美国经济, 就算事实真的如此, 也是按经济总量来衡量的, 并非人均收入—— 并不能说明经济的组成。
economic:adj.经济的,经济上的;经济学的; per capita:adj.每人的;人均的; composition:n.成分;作文;构成;创作;
China still has large areas of underdevelopment and per capita income is a better measure of the sophistication of the economy. 中国的广大地区 还很落后。 人均收入能够更好的衡量 经济的复杂性。
underdevelopment:n.不发达;[摄]显影不足; sophistication:n.复杂;诡辩;老于世故;有教养;
And that the Chinese won't catch up or pass the Americans until somewhere in the latter part, after 2050, of this century. 在这之后,中国才有可能在人均收入 超过美国, 那会是在本世纪,2050年以后。
latter:adj.后者的;近来的;后面的;较后的;
The other point that's worth noticing is how one-dimensional this projection is. 另外值得一提的是 这个预测的衡量标准 是多么的单一。
one-dimensional:adj.肤浅的;单面的;幻想的;
You know, it looks at economic power measured by GDP. 它看到是通过GDP, 衡量的经济实力。
measured:adj.缓慢谨慎的; v.测量; (measure的过去分词和过去式)
Doesn't tell you much about military power, doesn't tell you very much about soft power. 并不说明军事实力, 也不能说明软实力。
It's all very one-dimensional. 它的衡量标准是单一的。
And also, when we think about the rise of Asia, or return of Asia as I called it a little bit earlier, it's worth remembering Asia's not one thing. 而且说到亚洲的崛起, 或者是亚洲的回归, 就像我之前提到的, 需要注意的是亚洲不是一个整体。
If you're sitting in Japan, or in New Delhi, or in Hanoi , your view of the rise of China is a little different than if you're sitting in Beijing. 对于日本, 新德里, 或者河内来说, 对与中国的崛起 和中国自己的看法是不同的。
Hanoi:n.河内(越南首都); different than:不同于;
Indeed, one of the advantages that the Americans will have in terms of power in Asia is all those countries want an American insurance policy against the rise of China. 事实上,关于亚洲的势力 美国拥有的 一个优势 就是所有这些国家 都希望得到美国政策的保护 来制衡中国。
advantages:n.有利条件; v.有利于; insurance policy:n.保险单;
It's as though Mexico and Canada were hostile neighbors to the United States, which they're not. 就像墨西哥和加拿大 历史上是美国不很友好的邻邦, 现在也是这样的。
hostile:adj.敌意的; n.敌对分子;
So these simple projections of the Goldman Sachs type are not telling us what we need to know about power transition. 所以高盛作出的这些 简单的预测 并不能说明我们应该知道的 全力转移。
But you might ask, well so what in any case ? 然而,你可能会说,无论如何,那又怎么样呢？
in any case:无论如何;
Why does it matter? Who cares? 为什么这一点很重要？谁会在乎？
Is this just a game that diplomats and academics play? 这只是一场 外交家们和学术界的一场游戏吗？
diplomats:外交官; academics:n.学术水平;学术知识;专业学者;
The answer is it matters quite a lot. 答案是这一点很重要。
Because, if you believe in decline and you get the answers wrong on this, the facts, not the myths , you may have policies which are very dangerous. 因为,如果相信衰落 关于这个问题得到的答案是错误的, 事实上,不是谣传, 这样错误的答案是很危险的。
myths:神话;谬见; policies:n.政策;方针;原则;为人之道;保险单(policy的复数)
Let me give you an example from history. 以下是历史上的例子。
The Peloponnesian War was the great conflict in which the Greek city state system tore itself apart two and a half millennia ago. 伯罗奔尼萨战争 是希腊城邦体制的 很大的冲突 导致了两千伍佰年前 希腊的分崩离析。
conflict:n.冲突;矛盾;争执;抵触;v.抵触; city state:n.城邦; millennia:n.千年期(millennium的复数);一千年;千年庆典;太平盛世;
What caused it? 根源是什么？
Thucydides, the great historian of the the Peloponnesian War, said it was the rise in the power of Athens and the fear it created in Sparta. 修西得底斯,伯罗奔尼萨战争时期的伟大历史学家, 说是因为希腊人的崛起 和斯巴达克人对希腊人崛起的恐惧。
Notice both halves of that explanation. 注意这前后这两部分的原因。
Many people argue that the 21st century is going to repeat the 20th century, in which World War One, the great conflagration in which the European state system tore itself apart and destroyed its centrality in the world, that that was caused by the rise in the power of Germany and the fear it created in Britain. 很多人认为 21世纪 将会重蹈20世纪的覆辙, 第一次世界大战 的战火 使得整个欧洲的体制 分崩离析 破坏了它在世界的中心地位, 原因就是 德国的崛起 和英国的恐慌。
conflagration:n.大火;快速燃烧;突发;冲突; centrality:n.中心;中央;向心性;
So there are people who are telling us this is going to be reproduced today, that what we're going to see is the same thing now in this century. 所以今天有些人告诉我们 今天这样得历史将会重演, 为我们将会看到的 是本世纪历史得重演。
reproduced:v.重现(reproduce的过去分词);再生产;生育;adj.再生的;重制的;
No, I think that's wrong. 不,我认为这不会发生。
It's bad history. 那段历史不会重蹈。
For one thing , Germany had surpassed Britain in industrial strength by 1900. 一方面,在1900年德国得工业实力 已经超过了英国。
For one thing:首先;一则; surpassed:v.超过,凌驾(surpass的过去分词形式);
And as I said earlier, 就像我之前说过的,
as I said:正如我所说的
China has not passed the United States. 中国还没有超过美国。
But also, if you have this belief and it creates a sense of fear, it leads to overreaction . 但同时如果相信衰落 就会产生恐惧, 导致过度反映。
overreaction:n.过度反应;
And the greatest danger we have of managing this power transition of the shift toward the East is fear. 我们在处理权利向东方转移时 面临的最大的危险 就是恐惧。
To paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt from a different context , the greatest thing we have to fear is fear itself. 用罗斯福的话 来说就是 我们最需要害怕的是害怕本身。
paraphrase:n.释义;解释;意译;vt.释义; context:n.环境;上下文;来龙去脉;
We don't have to fear the rise of China or the return of Asia. 我们不需要害怕中国的崛起 或者亚洲的回归。
And if we have policies in which we take it in that larger historical perspective , we're going to be able to manage this process . 如果我们采取的 政策 能够从历史的大局出发, 我们就可以 处理好这个过程。
historical:adj.历史的;史学的;基于史实的; perspective:n.观点;远景;透视图;adj.透视的; process:v.处理;加工;列队行进;n.过程,进行;方法,adj.经过特殊加工(或处理)的;
Let me say a word now about the distribution of power and how it relates to power diffusion and then pull these two types together. 现在我想说的一个词就是 权利的分配 以及它是如何和权利的分散相联系的 然后我会把二者撮合到一起。
distribution:n.分布;分配;分发;分销;
If you ask how is power distributed in the world today, it's distributed much like a three-dimensional chess game. 如果你们想知道今天世界的是如何分配的, 权利的分配很像是 三维的象棋。
distributed:adj.分布的;分散的;v.分发;分配;使分布(distribute的过去分词和过去式) three-dimensional:adj.三维的;立体的;真实的;
Top board: military power among states. 最高层: 各国的军事力量。
The United States is the only superpower , and it's likely to remain that way for two or three decades. 美国是唯一的超级大国, 而且未来20到30年 依然如此。
superpower:n.超级大国;超级强权;
China's not going to replace the U.S. on this military board. 中国在军事这盘棋还不能取代美国。
Middle board of this three-dimensional chess game: economic power among states. 这盘三维象棋的中间是: 各国经济实力的较量。
Power is multi-polar . 经济实力是多极的。
multi-polar:多极的;
There are balancers -- the U.S., Europe, 各级之间相互平衡。 美国,欧洲,
China, Japan can balance each other. 中国,日本 能够相互制衡。
The bottom board of this three-dimensional, the board of transnational relations, things that cross borders outside the control of governments, things like climate change, drug trade, financial flows, pandemics , all these things that cross borders outside the control of governments, there nobody's in charge. 三维象棋的最下层, 是各国之间的关系, 是各国政府所不能够控制的因素, 例如气候变暖,毒品走私, 货币流入和流出, 传染病, 所有这些跨国因素 都不是政府所能掌控的, 而且也没有人负责。
transnational:adj.跨国的;超越国界的; pandemics:大流行;流行病;
It makes no sense to call this unipolar or multi-polar. 把这些叫做单极或者多极是没有 任何意义的。
Power is chaotically distributed. 权利的分配是很混乱的。
chaotically:adv.混乱地;
And the only way you can solve these problems -- and this is where many greatest challenges are coming in this century -- is through cooperation , through working together, 而且唯一能解决这些跨国问题的—— 这也正是本世纪出现的很多 大的挑战的唯一出路—— 那就是合作, 通过互相合作,
cooperation:n.合作;配合;
which means that soft power becomes more important, that ability to organize networks to deal with these kinds of problems and to be able to get cooperation. 也就是说软实力越来越重要了, 协调各国的关系 来解决这些问题 并达成一致日益重要。
organize:v.组织;安排;处理;分配;管理;
Another way of putting it is that as we think of power in the 21st century, we want to get away from the idea that power's always zero sum -- my gain is your loss and vice versa . 另外一种阐释就是 说到21世纪的权利, 我们想要摆脱 权利总是走向零和—— 不是你死就是我活
vice versa:反之亦然;
Power can also be positive sum, where your gain can be my gain. 权利也可以是正和, 你获得的同时我也可以获得。
positive:adj.积极的;[数]正的,[医][化学]阳性的;确定的;n.正数;[摄]正片;
If China develops greater energy security and greater capacity to deal with its problems of carbon emissions , that's good for us as well as good for China as well as good for everybody else. 如果中国能的能源安全发展的更好, 处理 碳排放的能力越强 对我们来说有好处, 同时对中国有好处 而且对每个国家都有好处。
carbon:n.[化学]碳;碳棒;复写纸;adj.碳的;碳处理的; emissions:n.(光、热、气等的)发出,排放;排放物;散发物;(emission的复数) as well as:也;和…一样;不但…而且;
So empowering China to deal with its own problems of carbon is good for everybody, and it's not a zero sum, I win, you lose. 因此赋予中国 应对温室效应的能力 对谁都有好处, 而且这不是一个零和游戏,我赢你就输了。
empowering:v.授权;给(某人)…的权力;增加(某人的)自主权;(empower的现在分词)
It's one in which we can all gain. 这是一场双赢的游戏。
So as we think about power in this century, we want to get away from this view that it's all I win, you lose. 所以想到本世纪的 权利, 我们要摆脱这种 你死我活的观念。
Now I don't mean to be Pollyannaish about this. 我并不是过分乐观。
Wars persist. Power persists. 战争已就存在,权利依旧存在。
Military power is important. 军事力量依旧很重要。
Keeping balances is important. 保持平衡很重要。
All this still persists. 所有这些仍然继续。
Hard power is there, and it will remain. 硬实力很重要, 而且依然很重要。
But unless you learn how to mix hard power with soft power into strategies that I call smart power, you're not going to deal with the new kinds of problems that we're facing. 但是除非学会如何将 硬实力和软实力相结合 到我所说的巧实力的战略中, 就不用再处理我们所面对的类似的 新问题了。
strategies:n.策略;行动计划;部署;战略;(strategy的复数)
So the key question that we need to think about as we look at this is how do we work together to produce global public goods, things from which all of us can benefit? 因此关键问题是关于这个问题时我们需要 思考如何合作 来创造有益于全世界 有益于每个国家的东西。
global:adj.全球的;总体的;球形的;
How do we define our national interests so that it's not just zero sum, but positive sum. 思考如何定义国家利益 这样它就不再是零和, 而是正和。
In that sense, if we define our interests, for example, for the United States the way Britain defined its interests in the 19th century, keeping an open trading system, 那样的话,如果我们能够定义我们的利益, 例如,在19世纪英国 认为美国可以使其 保持开放的贸易体系,
keeping a monetary stability , keeping freedom of the seas -- those were good for Britain, they were good for others as well. 稳定的货币,和海上自由—— 这些对英国都是有利的, 对其他国家也是有利的。
monetary:adj.货币的;财政的; stability:n.稳定性;坚定,恒心;
And in the 21st century, you have to do an analog to that. 在21世界,我们应该以史为鉴,
analog:n.[自]模拟;类似物;adj.[自]模拟的;有长短针的;
How do we produce global public goods, which are good for us, but good for everyone at the same time ? 如何创造有利于全世界, 有利于我们自己, 但同时又有利于每个人的事情,
at the same time:同时;另一方面;与此同时;
And that's going to be the good news dimension of what we need to think about as we think of power in the 21st century. 这就是我们在思考 21世纪的权利时 想到的一些好的结果。
There are ways to define our interests in which, while protecting ourselves with hard power, we can organize with others in networks to produce, not only public goods, but ways that will enhance our soft power. 对于国家利益的理解, 在用硬实力保护自我的同时 我们还可以协调和其他国家的关系 来创造不仅是有利于全世界 同时也有利于增强我们的软实力的理解。
enhance:v.提高;增强;增进;
So if one looks at the statements that have been made about this, 因此得到这一结论的 说法,
statements:n.说明; v.(英国)对儿童进行特殊教育评估认定; (statement的第三人称单数和复数)
I am impressed that when Hillary Clinton described the foreign policy of the Obama administration, she said that the foreign policy of the Obama administration was going to be smart power, as she put it, "using all the tools in our foreign policy tool box." 希拉里克林顿 关于奥巴马政府 外交政策的阐述让我印象颇深, 她说奥巴马政府的外交政策 应该立足于巧实力, 就向她说得那样“利用 外交政策的各种策略。“
impressed:adj.印象深刻; v.使钦佩; (impress的过去分词和过去式) Hillary:n.希拉里(美国国务卿); described:v.描述;形容;把…称为;做…运动;(describe的过去分词和过去式)
And if we're going to deal with these two great power shifts that I've described, the power shift represented by transition among states, the power shift represented by diffusion of power away from all states, 要处理好 我提到的这两种全力转移, 一种是国家之间权利的转移, 一种是 从国家分散出来的权利,
represented:v.代表; (represent的过去式和过去分词)
we're going to have to develop a new narrative of power in which we combine hard and soft power into strategies of smart power. 我们就需要形成关于权利的新的阐释 将软硬实力结合 到巧实力中。
And that's the good news I have. We can do that. 这就是我说的好消息。我们能够做到。
Thank you very much. 非常感谢。
(Applause) （鼓掌）